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only after a verdict was returned that the
trial court "exercising its perceived
power to engage in judicial hindsight,
stated that it should never have permitted the case to continue and sua sponte
embarked on the sanctions phase of the
trial." Id. at 478, 568 A.2d at 863.
Although the court conceded that justified sanctions could be imposed for
conduct during the trial, such as dilatory
tactics or abusive conduct, no such allegations were ever made. Id. at 479,568
A.2d at 864. Accordingly, the court held
that because the evidence was sufficiently debatable to deny motions
throughout the trial, it was sufficient to
justify Gerst in bringing and continuing
her case. Id. Thus, the court of special
appeals concluded that the trial court's
decision was clearly erroneous. Id. at
479-80, 568 A.2d at 864.
In so ruling, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland once again clearly discouraged the excessive use of Rule 1-341
sanctions. Such use can only impose a
chilling effect on a plaintiff's right to
court access, while providing an uncertain environment for attorneys to act. As
the court opined, Rule 1-341 should only
be used in the most extreme of instances
when a claim is clearly meritless and
intended to remedy only intentional misconduct.
- Vasiliki Papaioannou

Pavelic & leFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group: SANCTIONS FOR VlOIATIONOFHID~RurnOF~

PROCEDURE 11 ONLY APPLY TO

TIlE INDIVIDUAL SIGNER
In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989),
the United States Supreme Court held
that sanctions provided by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 ("Rule 11") only
applied to the attorney who signed a
paper in violation of Rule 11, even if the
attorney explicitly signed on behalf of his
fIrm.
On behalf of Northern ]. Calloway,
attorney Ray 1. leFlore brought a willful
copyright infringment claim in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Marvel
Entertainment Group ("Marvel"). In an
amended complaint, Calloway alleged
that Marvel forged his signature. After
initiation of the claim, leFlore formed the
law partnership ofPavelic & leFlore with
Radovan Pavelic. Several papers relying
on the allegation of forgery were signed:
"Pavelic & leFlore
By /s/ Ray 1. leFlore
(A Member of the Firm)
Attorneys for Plaintiff. "

Id. at 457. The district court found that
these papers were in violation of Rule 11
and imposed a sanction in the amount of
$100,000 against Pavelic & leFlore.
Upon a motion by Radovan Pavelic, the
district court shifted half of the sanction
from the fIrm to LeFlore, because the fum
did not exist during the major part of the
litigation. However, the district court rejected Pavelic's contention that Rule 11
only empowered the court to impose the
sanction upon LeFlore and not upon the
fum. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affIrmed the sanction. The Second Circuit's decision directly conflicted
with a Fifth Circuit holding that authorized Rule 11 sanctions against only the
individual signers. Id. at 458 citing Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808
F.2d 1119, 1128-30 (1987)).
Pavelic appealed to the United States
Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the
Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit and
reversed the Second Circuit. In interpreting Rule 11, the Court relied on the plain
meaning of the rule. Pavelic & LeFlore,
110 S. Ct. at 458 (citing Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446U.S. 740, 750n.9(1980)).
Where a pleading, motion, or other
paper violates Rule 11, the rule requires
the trial court to "impose upon the person who signed it . . . an appropriate
sanction." Id. The Court noted that if
viewed in isolation, the phrase "person
who signed" is ambiguous. Id. However,
upon reading the phrase in the entire
context of Rule 11, the Court reasoned
that since Rule 11 begins "with a requirement of individual signature, and then
proceed [s] to discuss the import and consequences of signature, ... references to
the signature in the later portions must
reasonably be thought to connote the
individual signer mentioned at the outset." Id.
In rejecting Marvel's contention that
the legal principles of partnership and
agency should apply, the Court emphasized that Rule 11 established a duty that
an attorney could not delegate. Id. at 459.
The Court also held that although LeFlore
explicitly signed on behalf of his fIrm, the
sanction only applied to leFlore individually. The Court reasoned that a signature
on behalf of a fum could not comply with
the fIrst sentence of Rule 11, since it
requires papers to be signed "by at least
one attorney of record in the attorney's
individual name." Id. The Court noted
that in the past, the preferred practice for
an attorney was to sign on his own behalf
with the name of his fIrm beneath. Id.
(citing Gavit, The New FederalRules and
State Procedure, 25 A.B.A.). 367, 371
(1939)).

Although a law fum may have more
funds than an individual signer, the Court
noted that the purpose of the sanction
was punishment rather than reimbursement. The Court also noted that the function "of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring
home to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility." Id.
at 460. Moreover, the Supreme Court
determined that holding an individual
signer personally liable provides a greater
economic deterrent. Id.
In a lone dissent, Justice Marshall argued that Rule 11 sanctions can apply to
a law fum. At fIrst, the rule uses the term
"signer," but later in its discussion of
sanctions, the rule uses the phrase "the
person who signed." Id. at 461 (Marshall,
]., dissenting). The dissent noted that in
the context of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, one could reasonably assume
that the drafters meant the term "person"
to include partnerships and professional
corporations. Id. (Marshall, )., dissenting) (citing 5 u.s.c. § 551 (2); NY. Partnership Law § 2 (McKinney 1988)).
Recognizing that the sanction should be
tailored to each situation, Justice Marshall opined that Rule 11 allowed the trial
judge to decide whether sanctions
would more properly be applied to the
attorney or his law fum. Id. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reasoned that individual accountability may
be heightened if an attorney's negligence
also subjected his law fIrm to liability. Id.
at 461-62 (Marshall,]., dissenting).
In holding that Rule 11 sanctions apply
only to the attorney who signs a paper in
violation of the rule, the United States
Supreme Court precluded the application of Rule 11 sanctions to law firms. As
a result, parties may fmd it more difficult
to collect reimbursement for expenses
caused by Rule 11 violations, but personal liability may provide a greater incentive for attorneys to comply with Rule
11.
-Richard E. Guida

Simpler v. State: POllCE MAY NOT

FRISK A SUSPECf AS A MATI'ER OF
ROUI1NE CAIDlON, TIJERE MUST BE
A REASONABLE SUSPIOON TIIAT
THE SUSPECf IS ARMED AND DANGEROUS
In Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 568
A.2d 22 (1990) the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held the seizure of paraphernalia with marijuana residue was unconstitutional where the suspect was frisked
without reasonable suspicion that he was
armed and dangerous.
On the evening of May 8, 1987, Sergeant Wassmer (Wassmer), of the Cecil
County Sheriff's Department, and a
young explorer scout were on routine
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